The Principle Of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Politics Essay

The Principle Of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Politics Essay accessThe assertion that clime multifariousness is anthropogenic and poses a serious nemesis to gentlemanity is considered a valid consid datetion by many schools of thought. This argument presents a platform for continual dialogue and negotiations amid nations, supported with inciteions towards mitigating humour neuter and its threats. Resulting from several negotiations, which be not with give away tilt, be agreements, plans and policies much(prenominal) as the Kyoto Protocol, the Montreal Action Plan, the Rio Declaration and the Bali Road Map etc. all forge to ensure collective and wide affair amongst states in addressing modality channel. Also, as part of global efforts, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the United Nations (UN), is as sign-language(a) the task of generating guidelines and reports and inter dislodgeablewise assessing the effects of hu mour substitute and the adequacy of response measures (Svensson, 2008). In addition, the United Nations Framework congregation on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is adopted by many states in order to pr even striket this negative flip-flop by mainly minimising the total of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission into the atmosphere (Svensson, 2008 Ringius et al., 2002). However, concerns have been raised roughly the efficacy and feasibility of pulsation of these agreements, plans and frameworks as measures for controlling and managing modality diversify (Monbiot, 2006 Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002 Hardy, 2003). These concerns call for unbiased reviews of mode counter substitute mitigation measures and the teachings behind them in spite of appearance different framings of the problem. In this paper, I discuss a draw belief behind humor change mitigation measures. I weigh the evaluate of lawfulness in humor change mitigation and identify the advantages and disadvantages of ado pting the linguistic rule of cat valiumalty unless separate obligation (CBDR). In conclusion, I learn a reason for introducing executable tenets as measures for tackling climate change.EQUITY IN CLIMATE CHANGEClimate change stinkpot be frame as a single or combination of issues much(prenominal) as ethical, political, historical, scientific, security and health issues etc (Randall, 2010). However, law laughingstock fight that although the universal light of the magnitude of climate change is hinged mainly on scientific claims and evidence, this recognition is broadened within the other issues or framings pay heeded. Principles and mechanisms to control climate change be proposed, substantial and implemented at local and introduction(prenominal) scales around these framings (Randall, 2010). Nonetheless, one consequential factor underlying these scales and framings is in impartiality (Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002). Incidentally, the right way is arguab ly the starting clock point of the discourse on climate change mitigation (Barkham, 1995). It forms the crux of the matter and as well constitutes the bane of many debates and negotiations on climate change (Ashton and Wang, 2003). Yet, Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe (2002) contend that equity is not adequately addressed in key agreements and documents relating climate change. Contrary to this claim, Ashton and Wang (2003) make do that equity permeates UN negotiations and agreements on climate change. upright participation is to a large extent dependent on the ground of the challenges posed by climate change (Skea and Green, 1997). On these premises, I argue that the explicit understanding of equity in the context of climate change at a local or multinational scale sets the breaker point for blondness in dealing with climate change problems. Notwithstanding, it is important to mention that it is difficult to reach a consensus on equity since it is reliant on different philoso phical beliefs and notions (Ikeme, 2003).While it erect be argued that climate change is a common problem, it also fair to recognise that responsibilities and jars vary (Harris, 1999 Ashton and Wang, 2003). Consequently, differences and disagreements emerge. The phrase, cheating(prenominal) advantage in climate change negotiations, questions the practicability of equity and the cellular inclusion of the common and differential nature of this global challenge. This undermines efforts to obtain viable effects (Skea and Green, 1997). The guileless recognition of iniquity or equity whitethorn be considered a reasonable act of justice and key to solving the climate change problem. Thus, I put forward that the acceptance of equity as an constitutional component of negotiations opens up rather chaotic but pertinent twists in the climate change debate which on one hand butt end promote the efforts towards mitigating climate change and on the other hand behave as a conundrum agains t solutions.To explore these arguments and make a case for viable climate change solutions, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) as a tool for negotiating climate change solutions is defined and dissected at an international scale. This principle is equity- ground and has been applied in key climate change negotiations (Ikeme, 2003 Okereke, 2008 Matsui, 2004 Ashton J. and Wang X., 2005).Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, 1992 Common but differentiated indebtedness (CBDR)The application of this principle in the climate change saga has its origin from the UNFCCC Rio primer coat summit of 1992 (Harris, 1999 Ashton and Wang, 2003 Matsui, 2004). It is regarded as the key principle in addressing the problem of GHG emissions in the Kyoto protocol (Matsui, 2004 Harris, 1999). The principle of CBDR is established on the ground of equity and fairness and demands much responsibility from develop countries in a global participation towards seeking climate ch ange solutions (Harris, 1999 Ashton and Wang, 2003 Matsui, 2004). The principle states thatStates shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earths ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries ack right offledge the responsibility that they digest in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies go into on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command. (Source United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP, www.unep.org)This principle has come under close scrutiny and criticism in the climate change mitigation debate. Both the underdeveloped and developed states remain quizzical slightly this principle (French, 2000 Okereke, 2008).Why the principle of CBDR?Given the complexity of issues and arguments arisin g from climate change debates, one can only wonder how decisions can be regarded as fair and frank (Ashton and Wang, 2003 Carzola and Toman, 2000). And if they are regarded as such how can their efficiency be measured? Outlining the reasons behind the application of this principle in this discourse sets the stage for a thorough analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. These reasons areTo attain between the contributions of the developed and exploitation states in the emission of GHG and subsequently make their contributions in remedying the problem (Weisslitz, 2002 Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002).To ensure financial aid and clean engine room transfer to the underdeveloped states as a measure of mitigating climate change (Ashton and Wang, 2003 Shah, 2009).To provide a philosophical and legal support for achieving the purposes of key international agreements such as the Kyoto protocol etc. note this principle is not a legal obligation (McManus, 2009 Rajamani, 2000).Iden tification and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Principle of CBDR as a solution to climate changeIn relating CBDR to answering the following questions who should accept responsibility for climate change? and on what basis should responsibilities be assigned, one can explore the pros and cons of this principle within different framings. The ambiguous nature of this principle in global climate change negotiations warrants answering these questions at an international scale. Livermann (2008) reinforces this assertion by pointing out that the challenge of the blame game in assigning responsibilities to states is controlled under negotiations driven by the principle of CBDR. Nevertheless, she concedes that at that place controversies in applying this principle.StrengthsFirst, from a historical framing, it is difficult to reconcile the contribution of different polluters on an international scale over a long period of time (Caney, 2005). Attributing emissions right awayly to a country (from which the emission emanate) is impractical largely because GHG ram completely mixed up in the atmosphere, which fundamentally has no confines (Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002). On this basis, the principle identifies a common responsibility (Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002) for all states. This common responsibility is intrinsic in climate change negotiations and forms the fulcrum of viable agreements.During the era of massive global industrialisation, a lot GHG were released into the atmosphere ( fourth part, 2006 Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002 Hardy, 2003). But the electrical shock of distribution of these GHG is irrespective of who is responsible (Ikeme, 2003). The need for historical accountability became diaphanous during climate change negotiations (Neumayer, 2000). In this regard, the CBDR recognises that there are historical differences in emissions between the develop and the developed states and between developed states (Hepburn and Ah mad, 2005). In the spoken communication of Ikeme (2003, pp 7), bygones are not bygones. On this note one can argue that this principle is progressive in an intergenerational context. It considers how the emissions of the past can affect the future. It also establishes a moral and ethical basis for environmental justice which cannot be legally guaranteed (Kamminga, 2008 Ikeme, 2003). there are strong indications that climate change has an impact on the worlds economy (Stern, 2006). Similarly, the worlds economy has a hand in climate change. The stinting boom which accompanied the industrialisation of the developed states arguably contend a major role in aggravating climate change, deviation developing states and future generations at more peril to its effects (Barker, 2008 Stern 2006). This peril is more obvious due to the scotch break of serve between these states. The CDBR is applied to this effect to bridge the economic gap between states, even though its application remains contentious (Najam et al., 2003 Ramajani, 2000). In the Kyoto protocol, economic based mechanisms adopted to mitigate climate change show the global hypnotism for shared responsibility (Halvorssen, 2007 Vashist, 2009). The CBDR is clearly one principle behind economic agreements of shared responsibility in the Kyoto protocol (Harris, 1999 Vashist, 2009). Thus CBDR is formulated to decorous economic needs of states while tackling climate change.The CBDR also saves developing states the damage of engaging in stringent carbon come forth regulations, thereby indirectly helping to build their economies in order to close the gap with the developed states. Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto protocol, this principle arguably enhances the coronation in clean technology globally, promoting ecological modernisation in the process. more than so, CBDR facilitates the need for developed states to provide technological and financial assistance to the developing states for combating climate change (Scarpace, unknown). Developed states get credits under the CDM for avoiding emissions. Though, McManus (2009) argues that by the CDM, developing states meet sustainable development targets, I remain atheistic about this claim since the developing states remain at the core of disagreements in negotiations. I argue my case in the next section.Matsui (2004) and Harris (1999) suggest that the CBDR encourages the developing states to participate in climate change negotiations by pressurizing the developed states to bear the greater responsibility in the interim. However, there is need to back up this encouragement with actions. It seems encouragement is not enough judging from the GHG emission levels of countries equivalent Brazil, China and India. While these countries are not committed to reducing their emissions now, I suggest this principle serves as legacy to ensure their future deference and commitment in climate change mitigation initiatives, esp ecially as they are at the forefront of pressing the developed states to comply with the Kyoto agreements.When adjust with neoliberal economic ideas and structures, the CBDR is usually successful (Okereke, 2008, pp 26). I argue that these ideas and structures are entwined in some of the mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol which encourage private participation in climate change mitigation such as the CDM. The introduction of equity based norms such as CBDR in approaching global environmental issues such as climate change shows the consideration of justice and equity in facing the challenge (Okereke, 2008).WeaknessesOn the contrary, the interpretation of the principle of CBDR sparks controversy in the allocation of historical responsibility to states. Liverman (2000) argues that this favours the developed states. She also points out that while developing states have low emissions with high vulnerability developed states have high emissions with low vulnerability. Hence, the basic interp retation of this principle is bleak of issues on vulnerability which is a big problem. Thus, one can reckon that this principle is fundamentally constructivist and to a large extent uncaring about the issue of vulnerability of some states to climate change. By virtue of this assertion, there is no firm commitment by developed states to aid countries such as Bangladesh and the Maldives which are more vulnerable to the rise in sea levels. The case of vulnerability is can be appreciated more from a health perspective. The emergence of many diseases is now attributed to the increasing global temperatures (Patz et al., 2007) and now climate change is seen as a threat to global human health (Cambell-Lendrum et al., 2007). It is also considered the largest health inequity of our time (Patz et at., 2007 pp.397). There is a notable asymmetry in vulnerability to diseases between the developed and developing states in favour of the developed states (Hardy, 2003, Patz et al., 2007, Cambell-L endrum et al., 2007). The CBDR alignment with the aftermath of GHG emissions is myopic.This principle is not modelled to advance sustainable development in the developing states. (Scarpace, Unknown). The exportation of greasy technology by developed states to developing states for financial benefits is contrary to the objective of sustainable development. Many heavy polluting multinational industries now establish their plants in developing states where there are no stringent emission regulations.By virtue of the CBDR, the weight of responsibility on developing countries to voluntarily cut GHG emissions is insignificant (Scarpace, unknown). Though, some schools of thought will argue that setting targets for developing states will limit their growth and possibly widen the economic gap which the principle aims to narrow (Pinguelli-Rosa and Munasinghe, 2002), I maintain that there should be some sort of commitment from developed nations based on this principle or a reviewed principle because climate change unperturbed remains a common problem.A scenario where some states with historically insignificant emissions but are now are big emitters with strong economic capabilities, is not adequately depicted in the CBDR. Due to their economic capacities some of these developing states can fully participate in reduction of GHG. Under the guise of the principle, these states like China do so little to solve the problem (Scarpace, Unknown).The ambiguity of this principle questions the level at which the principle should be adopted. Caney (2005) suggests that this principle may fit international interests but neglects lower level interest such as local national interests and individual interests.Finally, Matsui (2004) argues the CBDR has a propensity for what he calls double standard or what Okereke (2008) refers to as responsibility deficit where the willingness to act responsibly is superseded by cost-benefits. This contention is do worse on the grounds that the CBDR principle is not legally binding, irrespective of the fact that the Kyoto protocol was signed into law (Matsui, 2004 French, 2000). Also, the pressing economic needs of states may result in limited devotion of resources necessary for global solutions to climate change (French, 2000). There is also a sense of caution and competition amongst the developed countries such that they want to avoid any condition that may result in unfair economic advantage (Green and Skea, 1997, pp 3). More so, Okereke (2008) asserts that the nature of the CBDR could result in hegemony where developed nations in a bid to maintain their economic and world dominance, project an air of interest, claiming leadership in moral and intellectual discourses in climate change.DiscussionOnly agreements considered by all parties as equitable are likely to promote action and facilitate climate change mitigation (Ashton J. and Wang X., 2003). Such agreements must be built on the tenets of equity and driven by a singula r objective stop climate change if we can.Though the implementation of CBDR is wrought with several controversies, parties to climate change debates and negotiations must recognise that it is not an utopian principle. Concessions need to be made on ethical grounds if climate change is really considered a big threat to humanity.The CBDR is one important principle for tackling climate change equitably. Sceptics and critics have to clear that agreeing on a new principle to supplant or back-up CBDR may take several years, yet more claims of inequity may arise.The Polluter pay principle has a more direct approach to addressing emission issues. It could easily be drafted into law. However, it may undermine the economic gap between states (Caney, 2005). It focuses mainly finance and economics to the detriment of carnal and environmental outcomes of climate change. Without a strong historical basis, this polluter pay principle cannot be viable at any level in tackling climate change. Ho wever, there are arguments by Shue and Neumayer in Caney (2005) canvassing for laissez-faire(a) approach for accounting for historical deficits in adopting this principle.In my opinion, to make the CBDR more practicable and fit to meet the especially the challenge vulnerability in climate change, a consequentialist dynamic approach is needed. This approach shall integrate measures to assess the risk of climate change in different regions of the world and it shall be carried out continuously at different times. Global efforts will subsequently concentrate of the most vulnerable areas. This approach will not contain changing the wordings of principle 7. However, it will need a firm legal backing to ensure its implementation.ConclusionThe post Kyoto negotiations will take off in 2012 and Kamminga (2007) points out that improving the Kyoto protocol is a major concern. The CBDR still remains the most potent principle to bring all states to the round table for fair negotiations. Sacrifi ces must be made to mitigate climate change and the big polluters, especially the US, need to establish their sovereignty in the new negotiations. Doubting the evidence of climate change is one thing, but refusal to act reasonably negates the essence of the precautionary principle. Environmental and Political equalitarianism need reflect in the outcome of the 2012 negotiations.States need to ask, What is morally right to do in this situation? If the talk about globalization is anything real, whence we must all learn to be our brothers keepers. The big states seem to grade economic gains in climate change mitigation while the menial states are bent on playing the blame game. However, these states need to realise that the CBDR is still a potent tool with which to achieve collective viable climate change solutions.